We study how present and future adverse selection costs affect the prices of assets that may be traded repeatedly. We find that adverse selection is not a trading cost on average, and therefore future trading "costs" have no impact on current prices. Adverse selection can lead to allocational inefficiencies, which influence prices. Specifically, prices are reduced by the present value of all future allocation costs.
Introduction
This paper addresses the effect of repeated adverse selection. More specifically, it asks the question: How are future adverse selection costs presentvalued into current prices?
Adverse selection is important in many markets and receives significant attention in the literature. Akerlof (1970) shows that adverse selection can lead to a market breakdown. If some agents have liquidity motives for trade, however, markets need not break down. In this case, adverse selection gives rise to a bid-ask spread (Bagehot (1971) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ), and to a market impact of a trade (Kyle (1985) ). The literature that follows these papers focuses on how information is revealed through trading and reflected in prices. It abstracts from the question of how future information asymmetries affect the value of the option to retrade, and consequently the level of prices. In this literature the price is taken to be the expected liquidation value conditional on the order flow. This implies that average prices are equal to average liquidation values. This paper departs from the previous literature by allowing for the possibility that a (strategic) agent may need to liquidate his security position in the presence of adverse selection. In the previous literature, for instance Kyle (1985) , this is not the case, because the strategic agent is assumed to have no risk of facing a unexpected shock, such as a need for cash, inducing a need to liquidate, and because of an assumption of a final date with a perfectly liquid market.
In markets for durable goods, such as cars and houses, and in those for most financial assets, agents might need to liquidate unexpectedly into markets plagued by adverse selection problems. Liquidation could be induced by financial distress, hedging, a reduced need for the asset (lost service flows), unexpected relocation, and other reasons.
Given this possibility, agents anticipate future adverse selection costs. When an investor buys an asset, he must consider the costs associated with adverse selection at the future time at which he needs to sell. Moreover, the buyer at that time will face an adverse-selection problem when he wants to sell, and so on for the life of the asset. This paper models how these future adverse selection costs affect current prices.
The impact of future trading costs has been studied in a competitive framework with exogenous costs. Mendelson (1986, 1988) show that the price of an asset with fixed costs is the present value of future divi-dends, reduced by the present value of all future trading costs.
1 In empirical work the bid-ask spread is often taken as a proxy for this fixed cost. We show that if (part of) the bid-ask spread is generated by adverse selection, then reducing the price by the (entire) present value of all future bid-ask spreads is not correct.
Our results are most easily explained in the context of our basic model, with one asset and n risk-neutral agents. Each period, the owner receives a dividend and then a private signal about the next dividend and another private signal about whether or not he suffers a shock that conveys a motive to sell. If the owner suffers such a shock, then he has a cost of holding the asset. We interpret the shock as a need for cash, a state of financial distress, or as a reduced need for the asset. After receiving these private signals, the owner decides whether to keep the asset or to sell it to the other investors.
The costs of adverse selection are as follows. First, there is the wellknown lemons cost: If the owner sells, it is a bad signal to other market participants, because they know he may have adverse information, which leads to a discounted price. In an extension of the model, in which trades are both buyer-and seller-initiated, this effect generates a bid-ask spread. In the richer model, a buyer-initiated trade is good news to the market, and hence it is associated with a peach premium. The bid-ask spread is the sum of the lemons cost and the peach premium.
Our first key result is that the lemons cost and the peach premium are not trading costs on average, and therefore have a net present value of zero. Hence, if (part of) the bid-ask spread is generated by adverse selection, one should not reduce the level of prices by the present value of (this part of) future bid-ask spreads.
To see the intuition for this result, suppose first that the owner sells due to a need for cash. The market does not know that. Rather, it assigns a positive probability to the event that the sale is motivated by bad news, and therefore the owner is paid too little. When the owner sells because of information, on the other hand, since the market allows for the possibility of a liquidity sale, the owner is paid too much. In equilibrium, these effects balance, and therefore adverse selection is not a trading cost on average: the price paid for the asset is, on average, equal to the value of the asset.
Our second key result is that adverse selection induces a cost associated with not trading. This cost is incurred when the owner needs cash, but has such good news about the dividend that he (rationally) chooses not to sell. We call this an allocation cost. The market microstructure literature has generally abstracted from this cost. The fact that adverse selection can lead to inefficient allocations has been recognized, however, in various contexts in the literature (Akerlof (1970) , Leland and Pyle (1977) , Myers and Majluf (1984) , DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) , and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) ). In our model, the allocation cost is the real cost of adverse selection, and we study how it affects asset prices. We show that the price of an asset is reduced by the present value of all future allocation costs. In the case of both buyerand seller-initiated trades, what affects prices is the difference between the allocation costs for buyers and sellers.
To summarize, adverse selection has two effects on prices: a lemons cost and the present value of all future allocation costs. The relative importance of these effects depends on the maturity of the assets. The price of a short-lived asset is affected only by the lemons cost, whereas the price of a long-lived asset is affected by the future lifetime stream of allocation costs.
We consider the following extensions of our basic model: (i) a model with both buyer-and seller-inititated trades (as mentioned previously), (ii) a model in which all agents are privately informed about the asset and face the risk of a shock, (iii) a model with both fixed and informational costs, and (iv) a model with risk-averse agents. In these extensions, our main results hold: adverse selection is not a trading cost on average, but can cause allocation costs.
In our extension in which all agents are privately informed, the choice of trading mechanism is not trivial because of the double-sided asymmetric information. Hence, one might worry that our results depend on the choice of trading mechanism. The revenue equivalence result of Gârleanu and Pedersen (1999) shows, however, that the owner's decision to sell and the expected prices are the same for a large class of trading mechanisms.
Allowing all agents in the economy to receive private information further allows us to study the macro-economic effects of adverse selection. In particular, we consider how incentives to trade on information depend on agents' (common) risk of being in financial distress. An increase in the risk of distress diminishes the adverse selection problem because, when there is a sale, buyers ascribe a higher likelihood that this sale is due to a need for cash. When the distress risk is relatively low, an increase in this risk will lead to more informed trading because of the diminished adverse-selection problem. Hence, in times of financial distress even agents not affected are likely to sell.
In a similar vein, Kyle (1985) shows that the informed agent trades more when noise trading increases.
In our economy with double-sided asymmetric information there are two (additional) costs of selling: 1) the buyers' private information leads to imperfect competion, and 2) there is a risk of market-wide financial distress.
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When the risk of distress is large, these costs increase more than the adverse selection is diminished, and informed trading is curbed. Hence, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the level of informed trading and the level of distress-related trading, which is due to the general-equilibrium link between the level of liquidity trading and the overall market conditions. We further show that even risk-neutral agents act as if they are risk-averse with respect to changes in the risk of distress.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model and our results concerning adverse selection, Section 3 develops our extensions, and Section 4 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
Basic Model
In this section we construct a simple model in which a finite set, N = {0, 1, . . . , n}, of identical risk-neutral agents trade one object in each of periods 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 ≤ ∞. Trades are seller-initiated. Because of the assumptions of a single good and seller-initiated trades, we think of the asset as a durable good. Later, we consider a model which can be more readily thought of as a model a financial assets, in that there are multiple assets and both buyer-and seller-initiated trades.
The timing of events in any period, t, is shown in Figure 1 . First, the current owner of the asset, the agent denoted by o(t), receives a dividend. Then, he receives two independently distributed private signals, 3 x t ∈ R and σ t ∈ {0, µ}, where µ > 0. We assume that x t has mean 0, that P r(σ t = µ) = γ, and that (x t , σ t ) is independent across time. The signal x t gives 2 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) discuss the difficulties faced by a company in financial distress when selling assets, due to the fact that other companies in the same industry are likely to be distressed at the same time. Pulvino (1998) finds evidence for this effect for aircraft transactions. These papers do not, however, consider the implications for information-based trading.
3 The signals x t and σ t are integrable random variables. All random variables are defined on a given probability space (Ω, F , P r). the current owner private information about the dividend next period, t + 1. Specifically, the owner alone knows the value of the dividend next period, which is α + x t .
The signal σ t designates whether or not the current owner needs cash. If the owner needs cash (σ t > 0) then he has a holding cost of σ t . Hence, the current owner's utility from holding the asset this period is
which is lower than the utility derived by the other agents if σ t > 0. The parameters α, µ, and γ, as well as the distribution of x, are common knowledge. 4 After receiving the signals, the owner decides whether to keep the asset or to sell it. If he sells, each of the other agents makes a bid, and the highest bidder receives the asset after paying his bid.
5 Ties are broken using a (symmetric) randomization device.
We have described the economy and agents' possible actions. We now describe the trading game more formally and then derive a natural equilibrium.
A strategy for agent i is defined as a process A = A t
, where A t : Ω → {sell, keep} ∪ R is measurable with respect to the information, 6 F i t , available to player i at time t. A strategy, A, for agent i is said to be feasible if A t ∈ {sell, keep} if and only if agent i is the owner at the beginning of period t.
The utility agent i derives from playing the game from time t (after the dividend has been paid) onwards, given that agent j plays strategy A j for all j ∈ N , is
where z i s is the net cash payment 7 (due to sales or purchases of the asset) made by agent i at time s, and where the discount factor δ > 0 captures the agents' time preferences.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a set of feasible strategies, (A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n ), for the respective agents in N , such that, for all i ∈ N ,
for all strategies A feasible for agent i.
We are concerned in this paper only with symmetric Markov equlibria, that is, equilibria in which any agent's strategy at time t is a function of whether 6 Here, F i t is the σ-algebra generated by
where β s contains the actions at time s, that is, whether or not there is a sale, and in case of sale, the bids. 7 More precisely, z i s is defined as follows. If there is a sale at time s and agent j buys the asset for a price of P s , then z or not he is an owner, and of (x t , σ t ) (if he is an owner). The agents' optimal strategies are characterized using dynamic programming. To do that we define continuation-value functions. The continuation value at time t, after the dividend is paid and before information is received, is denoted by S t for the owner, and by B t for the non-owners, that is,
Consider first the strategies of the non-owners, given the owner's strategy. When there is a sale, all buyers bid their identical reservation value (Bertrand competition). The reservation value is the expected next dividend, plus the value of being an owner next period, reduced by the (opportunity cost associated with the) value of being a non-owner next period. Hence, the price is
using informal notation. (This definition ofx is made precise in Equation 7.)
Now, consider the owner's decision of whether to keep the asset or to sell it. He sells if and only if this gives him a higher continuation value than that obtained by keeping the asset, that is, if
which is simplified using (5) to
Hence, the owner sells if his news about the dividend is worse than a cut-off level, which depends on whether the owner needs cash. Given these strategies, equilibrium is characterized by the condition that the buyers' expectations about the dividend are consistent with the owner's sale decision. That is, equilibrium is characterized by the condition that
If there is no solution to this equation then there is no equilibrium with trade. There always exists an equilibrium in which the owner never sells, and in case of an (off-the-equilibrium-path) sale, the buyers bid minus infinity. Existence of an equilibrium with trade is addressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There is a solution to (7) if and only if there is a number, y ∈ R, such that
Further, there exists a number, µ * ∈ R, such that if µ ≥ µ * , then there is a solution to (7).
The following proposition summarizes the structure of equilibria with trade, and characterizes the value functions.
Proposition 2 Supposex is a solution to (7). Then the following strategies constitute an equilibrium. The owner sells when x t − σ t ≤x and in that case all buyers bid the equilibrium price, which is given by (5). The value functions are given by
whereĉ = γ P r(x >x + µ) µ is the allocation cost.
It should be no surprise that there is no value associated with not owning the asset in this model (B t = 0). This is because non-owners have no private information and therefore cannot extract rents. In some of the extensions of the model in Section 3, however, there is a value to being a non-owner. The value of being an owner is the present value of future dividends, reduced by the present value of future allocation costs. The allocation cost is due to the possible misallocation of the asset -namely, it may be held by an agent with a negative private value instead of an agent with a zero private value. This happens when the owner has a need for cash and at the same time such good news about the next dividend that he chooses not to sell. The probability of this event is γ P r(x >x + µ). When this event occurs, the owner bears a holding cost of µ.
Knowing the value functions, we can compute the equilibrium price explicitly as
T s=t+1 δ s α, is the average price in a world in which x t and σ t are common knowledge. The other two terms are reductions in price due to adverse selection.
First, a sale signals to the market that the owner has bad news about the dividend, leading to a lemons discount,x < 0, to the price. This, however, is not a trading cost to the owner, on average. Essentially, the owner is paid the value of a lemon, but this is not a cost, since indeed he is selling a lemon. Conditional on selling because of a need for cash (σ > 0), the owner is paid too little, but conditional on selling for purely information reasons (σ = 0), he is paid too much. In equilibrium these effects balance. Therefore, future lemons discounts do not affect the current price.
Second, the price is reduced because of the allocation costs. The allocation cost is associated with a real reduction in the value of holding the asset (and leads to a welfare loss). Therefore, the price is reduced by the present value of all future allocation costs.
We note that the relative importance for the price of the lemons cost and of the allocation cost, respectively, depend on the maturity of the asset. In particular, the price of a short-lived asset (T = 1) is affected only by the lemons cost, while the price of an infinitely-lived asset (T = ∞) is affected by a perpetuity of allocation costs. It may be misleading, though, to draw general inferences about the term structure of the adverse-selection discounts based on our basic model. Certain fundamental features of the basic model may need to be changed to fit the economic situation at hand. These changes have a marked impact on the term structures of the price impact of adverse selection, by maturity. If the sale-inducing shock, for instance, does not represent a reduced need for the asset (in which case the the shock size can be taken constant), but rather a need for cash, then the size of the shock should increase with the price of the asset. In this case, when the asset is far from the maturity date, the size of the sale-inducing shock is large relative to the innovation x t in the dividend. Therefore, the owner rarely keeps the asset when in liquidity need, and hence the allocation cost is small. Consequently, the allocation cost eventually decreases with maturity. For a different example, suupose that the dividends, instead of being i.i.d., form a random walk.
8 Then the (absolute) lemons cost is higher for long-lived assets. We illustrate these points with Figure 2 , where we show the term structures of the two types of discounts when allowing all four possible combinations that arise from two choices of shock sizes (constant, as in the basic model, and proportional to the full-information value of the asset) and two choices for the dividend-generating process (i.i.d., as in the basic model, and a random walk, with all agents informed of the realization of the dividend, that is, of the mean of the next dividend).
Extensions
In this section we extend the basic model in various directions and show that our main conclusions apply under a wide range of circumstances.
Buyer-and seller-initiated trades
This section develops a simple model with both buyer-and seller-initiated trades.
We assume that there are K assets and N agents, with K > 2 and N − K > 2. Each agent can own one security or no security. Hence, we abstract from investors' quantity decisions (as do others, such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ). While this is a major restriction, we think that our intuition applies more generally.
At period, t, one randomly chosen agent, i, receives private information, x t and σ t . (Agent i can be either an owner or a non-owner.) As before, we assume that the dividend in the next period is α + x t , with E(x t ) = 0, and that agent i's value of holding the asset this period is α + x t − σ t . Here, we allow a slightly richer distribution for σ t . We assume that σ t takes the values µ, 0, and −µ − < 0 with probabilities γ, 1 − γ − γ − , and γ − , respectively. We interpret σ t = µ as a need for cash, a high financing cost, or as a reduced need for the asset, and σ t = −µ − as a state of excess cash, a low financing cost, or as an extraordinary need for the asset.
After agent i has received his private information, there is trade. The trading mechanism is designed to resemble, stylistically, the opening of the New York Stock Exchange.
9 Every agent can submit a limit order or a market order to buy or sell one share. A limit order specifies a price at which the agent is willing to buy or sell one share (this period). A market order is interpreted as a limit order with a price of plus or minus infinity. Orders are executed as follows. First, the "specialist" determines the set of prices at which supply equals demand, or at which any excess supply or demand is due to orders at this price. It is easy to see that this set is an interval. The mid-point of this interval is denoted the clearing price.
10 Then, all trades are executed at the clearing price. If there is an excess supply or demand at the clearing price, then a randomization scheme determines which orders are executed.
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The following strategies can be shown to constitute an equilibrium using arguments analogous to those in Section 2. Suppose the informed agent, i, is an owner. Then he submits a market order to sell if x t − σ t ≤x, wherex is given by (7), and otherwise he submits no order at all. Similarly, if i is a non-owner then he submits a market order to buy if x t − σ t ≥x, wherex is given bỹ
and otherwise he does not submit an order. All uninformed owners submit the same limit order to sell, which we will call the ask price. The uninformed buyers submit the same limit order to buy, the bid price. The equilibrium bid and ask prices are
whereĉ andc are the sell-side and buy-side allocation costs, respectively. That is,
The first term, T s=1 δ s α, of the bid and ask prices is the average price if there were no private information. (We note that this is not the value of the asset when allocated efficiently since agents can have positive private values (σ t = −µ − ) of owning the asset. Since there is only one agent with this private benefit and multiple objects, this benefit does not, however, affect competitive prices.) The bid price is reduced by the lemons cost,x < 0. The ask price is inflated by the peach premium,x > 0. The level of both bid and ask prices are reduced by the present value of the difference between future sell-side and buy-side allocation costs.
The bid-ask spread is δ (x −x) > 0. We note that if σ t is symmetrically distributed around 0 (that is, µ = µ − and γ = γ − ), thenĉ =c and the midprice is the same as the price with no asymmetric information, in spite of the presence of a positive bid-ask spread. In equilibrium, the bid-ask spread is not a trading cost on average. That is, a seller has a lemons cost, but indeed he is selling a lemon; a buyer is paying a peach premium, but indeed he is getting a peach.
All agents privately informed
Several interesting implications follow when one allows all agents to receive private signals, both about the dividend and about their private (liquidity) needs. We describe first the extension of the basic model and then discuss the results.
As in the basic model, the owner, o(t), receives private signals, as do the other agents in this extension. Specifically, any agent, i, receives the signals x i t and σ i t , which are mutually independent and i.i.d. across agents and time. We assume that x i t has zero mean and a continuous cumulative distribution function F with a support which is a closed interval X = [ χ, χ ].
The value of the dividend net of possible holding costs, to agent i, is
Here, the parameter β measures the importance of the non-owner's signals, which could be different from the importance of the owner's signal. The structure of the game is the same as in the basic model, in that the timeline of Figure 1 still applies. Since buyers are privately informed, competition is imperfect and the choice of trading mechanism may affect prices and allocations. Our results are robust to the choice of trading mechanism. Using the Multiperiod Revenue Equivalence Theorem of Gârleanu and Pedersen (1999) , we show that the owner's decision to sell, expected prices (which we denote by P t ), and value functions, S t and B t , are the same for a large class of trading mechanisms. We refer to Gârleanu and Pedersen (1999) for a general definition of an auction mechanism and the associated repeated trading game. The class of mechanisms that we consider is characterized by the following condition. This condition states that the agents' bids are increasing in x i t − σ i t , and that an agent with the worst possible private signal does not pay anything (nor will he receive anything). Many standard auctions, such as the firstprice auction, the second-price auction, and the ascending auction, satisfy Condition 1. In addition, our results apply for mechanisms in which a riskneutral intermediary buys the object from the owner and sells it in an auction, that satisfies Condition 1, to the other agents.
The equilibria in this class of economies with double-sided asymmetric information are characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists
12 µ ∈ R such that for µ > µ, for any mechanism, and for any equilibrium that satisfies Condition 1, the owner sells if x o(t) t − σ o(t) t ≤x − βη 1 − µη 2 , where η 1 > 0 and η 2 > γ n are functions of γ, n, and the distribution of x t . Here,x solveŝ
12 Here, µ depends on the model parameters. The reason that we need a large µ is as follows. The standard revenue equivalence results apply only when the support of the private signals is a connected set, which is not the case here because of the discreteness of σ i t . Revenue equivalence does apply, however, when a distressed buyer always bids less than an undistressed one, which is the case when µ is large. See Gârleanu and Pedersen (1999) .
The price and value functions are
Here,ĉ is the allocation cost and that ψ is the probability of a sale. The results of this proposition are natural and have several noteworthy features. First, the main conclusion of the basic model continues to hold: (i) Adverse selection creates a lemons discount,x, but this is not a trading cost on average and it does not affect the value functions, and (ii) adverse selection (together with the other frictions) leads to an allocation cost,ĉ, which builds up in the value, S, of owning, and hence in prices. The former result relies to some extent on the independence of the owner's signal and its additive impact on dividend value. Further, in this economy there are other frictions that influence prices and allocations. The buyers' private information leads to imperfect competition. Each buyer extracts an average rent, βη 1 /n, associated with his private information about the dividend, which translates into a cost for the seller of βη 1 . Similarly, each buyer extracts an expected rent µ(η 2 − γ n ) /n because of his private information about his need for cash. All buyers are in financial distress with probability γ n , and in this case the price is depressed by µ. The total cost to the seller associated with market-wide financial distress and distress-related rents is µη 2 . These considerations explain why the expected price, given in (14), is reduced by the cost of selling βη 1 + µη 2 . Further, the price is reduced due to all future trading costs associated with imperfect competition and marketwide distress through their effect on the value functions. The value of owning is reduced because of future costs of selling, while the value of being a nonowner, which arises from the rents that can be extracted, is the opportunity cost associated with being an owner. It is interesting to consider how the level of common distress risk affects adverse selection, and the incentives to trade on information. The distress risk, γ, can be regarded as a measure of the overall market liquidity. We next provide a comparative-statics analysis of γ in the context of a numerical example, in which we assume that x i t is uniformly distributed on [−1/2, 1/2]. Figure 3 shows the tendency to trade on information for different values of γ. For the parameters used, the owner always sells when distressed. When not distressed, the owner sells the asset if his private signal is lower than a cut-off level denotedx. We see that for sufficiently low levels of risk, an increase in γ induces the owner to trade more often, taking advantage of the higher chance that the rest of the market will perceive it as a liquidity trade. This result is striking: In times of financial distress in the market (higher γ), an agent not affected directly is more likely to sell. This result is similar to that of Kyle (1985) , who finds that information-based trading is increasing in the level of noise trading. In our model, however, high values of γ lead to sharply increasing trading costs, which curb information-based trade until eliminating it altogether. Hence, we find that, in a general equilibrium, information-based trading is non-monotonic in the degree of distress-related trading.
These changes in γ and the level of informed trading have effects on prices. Figure 4 shows that for short-lived assets the price is non-monotonic in γ. An increase in γ has several effects, pulling the price in opposite directions. First, it decreases the expected number of bidders who compete for the object, thus making competition less fierce and magnifying the risk of market-wide distress. Second, it increases the frequency of (liquidity-related) trade. These effects depress the price. Third, it diminishes the degree of adverse selection, since there are more forced sales. This leads to an increased price. For shortlived assets the latter effect dominates for small values of γ. The former effects dominate for larger values of γ. For long-lived assets, the price is decreasing in γ. This is due to the importance of future trading costs and the relatively smaller importance of adverse selection (in this example).
The value of owning the asset is concave in γ. (Compare in Figure 4 .) This means that our risk-neutral agents act as if they are risk-averse towards changes in γ. To illustrate this point, we assume that γ 0 = 0.4 and that γ t has outcomes γ 0 ± ∆ γ , with equal probability, for all t > 0. Figure 5 shows that the price is decreasing in the standard deviation, ∆ γ , of γ. This result is natural: A highly volatile "market liquidity" (γ) makes it likely that one is forced to sell at the worst possible times, namely, when there are very few bidders with no shock. We note that this result would be strengthened if we allowed multiple assets. In that case, an owner would be most likely to sell at times with many sellers (and few undistressed buyers).
Fixed costs
In this section, we study how the presence of fixed trading costs affects adverse selection.
Suppose that the owner must pay a fixed transaction cost c when he sells. This diminishes the value received upon selling, which modifies the equation defining the equilibrium determination of the expected signal given a sale as:
Equation 5, Section 2, for the price still applies, but the value function for owning the asset is now:
where ψ is the probability of a sale:
Naturally, as in the basic model, there is no value in being a non-owner, that is, B t = 0. The expression (17)for the value of owning shows that our results concerning adverse selection from the basic model are unchanged. The additional effect of the fixed cost is as shown by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) : The price is reduced by the present value of all future fixed costs incurred.
We note that the sale-set, whence the volume of trade, shrinks as c increases, consistent with the findings of Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos (1998) . Changes in the fixed transaction cost also change the severity of the adverse selection problem. First, higher fixed costs lead to larger allocational inefficiences. Second, higher fixed costs change the avergage quality of the sold asset, that is, change the lemons cost,x. The lemons cost may either increase or decrease. If the lemons cost decreases, the result of the increased transaction cost is an increase is the price (paid by the buyer) of a short-lived asset, and a simultaneous decrease in the prices of long-lived assets.
Risk Aversion
Suppose that all agents are risk-averse with respect to the cash flows (or, equivalently, service flows) of the asset net of the possible holding costs. They have the same time-addititive expected utilty, with von NeumannMorgenstern utility function, u( · ). Suppose further that the agents are risk neutral with respect to payments associated with trading the asset. Hence, Equation 1 for an agent's utility is modified to be
This utility function can be justified by the fact that prices are deterministic, and that income and expenses related to sales and purchases can be smoothed over time, and by an assumption that the asset is a durable good -such as a house -with service flows that must be consumed immediately. Similarly, Grossman and Laroque (1990) study an economy with assets that yield service flows that must be consumed immediately.
The equilibrium of the economy with these preferences is derived similarly to the equilibrium in the basic model. If the owner sells, then all buyers bid their reservation value,
Since the buyers are risk-averse, the owner is not paid the expected dividend, but the certainty equivalent of the dividend.
With this price, the owner chooses to sell if u(α + x t −σ t ) ≤ α +x. Hence, the equilibrium condition is
The value of owning is computed to be
The value of owning is the expected utility of future dividends, reduced by the future allocation costs, namely the loss in utility when an owner in need for cash chooses not to sell. As in the basic model adverse selection is not a trading cost on average in equilibrium: The owner is just as risk-averse as the buyers, and therefore he is happy to pay for the insurance provided by the fact that the price does not depend on his information about the dividend. Hence, it is not a cost to the owner that he is paid the certainty equivalent of the dividend (instead of the conditional expected value of the dividend).
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the extent to which adverse selection is priced and the way it affects the efficiency of allocations . Our two main results are: (i) adverse selection leads to a lemons discount, but this discount is not a trading cost on average, and therefore future lemons discounts do not affect current prices; and (ii) adverse selection leads to allocation inefficiencies, which depress the price by the present value of all future allocation costs. The relative importance of these effects depends on the maturity of the asset. We also study adverse selection in the presence of other market frictions, namely imperfect competition, market-wide financial distress, and fixed transaction costs. We demonstrate that our results concerning adverse selection are robust to the presence of these other frictions, show how the other frictions affect the severity of the adverse-selection problem, and determine how the additional frictions are priced.
Our model is, hower, limited. First, we assume that agents are (ex-ante) identical. This is crucial to the result that adverse selection is not a trading cost on average. It would consequently be of interest to build a model with heterogeneous agents. One must be aware, however, that a simple model need not be of help in this connection. For, consider an extension of the basic model in which there are different types of agents that differ in terms of their likelihood of financial distress, the quality of the information they learn if they own the asset, their discount rate, or their risk aversion. Suppose that an agent's type is private information and that trade is anonymous. In such an economy, an agent of type τ , say, has a value of owning of S τ . In case of a sale, a reasonable mechanism would assign the asset to an agent of the type that has the highest value of S τ . Hence, in some generic sense, only one type of agent is active in equilibrium, and we are essentially back to the basic model. To obtain the desired effect of multiple types that are active in equilibrium, one could consider a case in which buyers are also informed, allowing a buyer with a lower value S τ to end up buying in the event that this agent has favorable information.
Another limitation of our model is that the agents are restricted to own zero or one unit of the asset. While it seems reasonable that agents can only take limited positions, it is restrictive to assume that agents have no quantity decision within their limits. Intuitively, our results seem to also apply when investors can trade different quantities, but it might be valuable to extend the model to encompass this possibility. This extension is especially promising if combined with a relaxation of the assumption of exogenous financial distress. In that case, one could imagine that a large security position would be associated with some combination of a high risk and a high severity of financial distress.
